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Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act' in an effort to
set forth the "sole and exclusive standards" for foreign sovereign immu-
nity2 in United States courts.' The FSIA nevertheless fails to resolve the
issue of when parties in United States courts may sue foreign states for
the acts of nominally separate government instrumentalities.' These in-
strumentalities-government trading corporations, banks, and other com-
mercial enterprises-may be judgment proof, yet they and the foreign
state that owns or finances them may escape liability for commercial activ-
ity5 that harms American parties.' This Note addresses the problems that
1. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4),
1391(0, 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982)) [hereinafter referred to as FSIA]. The FSIA went into effect on
January 19, 1977.
2. For most of the United States' history, foreign nations enjoyed absolute immunity from the
judicial process of the United States. Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 147
(1812) (granting immunity to warship of France within boundaries of United States); Berizzi Bros.
Co. v. The Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926) (sovereign immunity principles applied alike
to warships and to government-owned merchant vessels). As states assumed a greater role in commer-
cial trade, however, the absolute immunity of foreign nations was challenged. The decision to recog-
nize or to disregard the state's immunity came to rest with the State Department, which sometimes
made a formal suggestion to the courts regarding immunity. This suggestion bound the courts after Ex
parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943) (suit dismissed because of State Department deter-
mination of immunity); cf. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 38 (1945) (denying immu-
nity after State Department took no position with respect to asserted immunity of vessel). In 1952, the
State Department adopted the restrictive theory of immunity, which limits immunity to public, as
opposed to commercial, acts of the sovereign. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser of the
Department of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General of the United States (May 19,
1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984-85 (1952). The State Department's position re-
mained dispositive until 1977, when the FSIA's delegation of decisionmaking authority to courts took
effect.
3. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 6610 [hereinafter cited as HoUsE REPORT] (FSIA sets forth "sole and exclusive stand-
ards" for foreign sovereign immunity).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982); see also Kane, Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A Procedural Com-
pass, 34 STAN. L. REV. 385, 386 (1982) (guidance provided by FSIA for immunity determinations
not clear).
5. See Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations: Sovereign Immunity (pt.
2), 85 COM. L.J. 228 (1980); Note, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Commercial Activity: A Con-
flicts Approach, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1440 (1983); Comment, Establishing Jurisdiction Under the
Commercial Activities Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 19 Hous. L. REv.
1003 (1982); Note, Effects Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Due
Process Clause, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 474 (1980).
6. A foreign public entity may claim sovereign immunity only if it qualifies as a foreign state, 28
U.S.C. § 1603(a)-(b) (1982), and only if the act giving rise to the suit is outside of specified excep-
tions to sovereign immunity. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1982). The FSIA codified this restrictive theory of
immunity.
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arise when a domestic party attempts to attribute the acts of a foreign
state instrumentality to the foreign state itself for the purpose of establish-
ing the court's jurisdiction over the claim.
This attribution process challenges the judiciary to determine jurisdic-
tion under difficult circumstances. Before deciding the jurisdictional issue,
a court requires knowledge about the relations between the government
and the instrumentality. Yet the court must conduct this fact-bound in-
quiry with due regard for the rights of foreign states. Given factual uncer-
tainty and the need to resolve it in a way sensitive to foreign sovereigns, a
court must carefully allocate the burdens of pleading and proof. It must
formulate the legal tests that impose and shift those burdens to vindicate
the rights of the domestic party while protecting the foreign state's rights
to qualified immunity and due process of law.
A court that would exercise jurisdiction over a foreign state must also
meet its institutional responsibilities to the coordinate branches. The judi-
ciary must construe the FSIA in accordance with Congress' intent, and
avoid provoking the foreign state to threaten United States foreign policy
interests that the executive branch is charged with protecting.
This Note proposes a structural solution that mediates the conflict be-
tween a plaintiff's equitable claims for relief and a foreign state's right to
avoid liability for activities to which it is only tenuously connected. Part I
establishes that the FSIA is silent as to when a foreign state should be
sued for indirect involvement in the wrongdoing of a nominally separate
entity. Part II argues that the judiciary should resolve this issue. Un-
checked judicial discretion, however, might damage United States foreign
policy interests. Accordingly, Part III proposes legal tests of instrumental-
ity-government relations to control the exercise of jurisdiction over the
government. Part IV concludes that, even if statutory and constitutional
requirements permit the action to go forward, the court should still ex-
amine whether maintaining comity among nations requires abstention
from jurisdiction.
I. THE AMBIGUITY OF THE FSIA
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act limits the extent to which for-
eign public entities may invoke sovereign immunity as a defense to claims
raised against them in United States courts.7 Under the FSIA, a domestic
7. Under the FSIA, state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction and must apply the same
rules of foreign sovereign immunity. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1605, 1607 (1982). The statute also provides
that "[c]laims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United
States and of the States in conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter." 28 U.S.C. § 1602
(1982). In addition, foreign states may remove to federal courts any civil actions commenced against
them in state courts. Id. § 1441(d).
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party is generally allowed to sue foreign states for their commercial activi-
ties. The FSIA did not foreclose the possibility that foreign states could be
sued for the acts of a nominally separate entity." The Supreme Court
similarly has left the issue unresolved. Nor do the due process clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution foreclose such
suits. The fairness concerns embodied in due process analysis, however, do
disclose the need for principles and procedures that prevent excessive as-
sertions of jurisdiction.
A. The Statutory Framework
With the FSIA, Congress attempted to provide federal and state courts
with a comprehensive9 framework to resolve all issues of foreign sovereign
immunity.10 The FSIA recognizes a general rule of immunity for a for-
eign state acting under its own name or through an instrumentality or
government-owned entity."' If it qualifies as a "foreign state," it is pre-
sumptively immune unless the plaintiff can show that immunity is un-
available because the defendant's act falls under one of the expressly rec-
ognized exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity. These subject matter
exceptions cover commercial activities having a nexus to the United States,
waivers of immunity, expropriation claims, and most non-commercial tort
claims. 2 Under the FSIA, a plaintiff's failure to fit the action against the
state into one of these subject matter exceptions to immunity is a jurisdic-
tional defect and bars suit.1 3 This scheme, however, has two important
shortcomings.
First, the foreign state may attempt to shield itself by acting through a
corporate instrumentality. States with private or mixed economies, as well
as states with centralized economies,' commonly use corporations and
8. See infra note 23.
9. See supra note 3.
10. The general purposes of the FSIA are (1) to codify the restrictive principle of sovereign im-
munity of states; (2) to remove decisions on sovereign immunity from the executive branch and give
them to the judiciary, thereby reducing the foreign policy implications of immunity determinations;
(3) to provide a method of service of process for foreign state defendants; and (4) to establish a method
of satisfying judgments against foreign states. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 7-8.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1982).
12. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(1), (2), (3), (5) (1982). Congress also denied immunity for claims in-
volving gifts and succession or immovable property situated in the United States. 28 U.S.C. §
1605(a)(4) (1982).
13. Failure to fit the foreign state into one of the subject matter exceptions to immunity defeats
subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1982). Since personal jurisdiction equals sub-
ject matter jurisdiction plus service of process, the failure also defeats personal jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1982).
14. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 103 S. Ct. 2591,
2598-99 (1983). In Western European countries, the state-owned sector of the economy is expanding
and beginning to dominate in many vital industries, from electronics and computers to oil, steel and
transportation. See Heilbroner, The Coming Invasion, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Dec. 8, 1983, at 23, col.
1.
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other legal entities to conduct a variety of trading, banking, and investing
activities.15 These activities can harm American parties, yet a potential
plaintiff may be unable to obtain redress16 or even a hearing by suing
only the instrumentality. By the time the case reaches judgment, the for-
eign state may have dissolved the instrumentality without appointing a
successor entity.' Alternatively, the instrumentality may be insolvent, or
have no assets in the United States.
In these situations, the plaintiff's only source of redress is the foreign
state itself. To sue the state, the plaintiff must connect the state with the
damage caused by the instrumentality. Of course, a state that merely owns
an independently operating entity is not liable 8 for the acts of that en-
tity.19 Yet it may sometimes be equitable to permit the plaintiff to sue the
foreign state. The conduct of the foreign state and the pattern of foreign
state-foreign entity relations may properly subject the foreign state to the
jurisdiction of United States courts.
Second, the FSIA simply overlooks the case in which an American de-
fendant, sued by a foreign instrumentality, holds a legally cognizable
claim against the instrumentality's parent state for a different cause of
action. The FSIA appears to allow a state to invoke sovereign immunity
to avoid the suit of an American party even while its instrumentality
avails itself of the court's authority against that same party.
These concerns suggest that courts should in some cases assert equitable
jurisdiction over the foreign state for acts of its instrumentality. When a
15. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 15-16 (examples of agencies or instrumentalities of a for-
eign state include state trading corporation, mining enterprise, transport organization, central bank,
and export association).
16. A primary purpose of the FSIA is to protect the rights both of foreign states and of litigants in
United States courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1982).
17. The plaintiff will be entitled to obtain redress from any successor that takes over the assets
and liabilities of the state entity, if the successor has assets. The initial defendant's contacts with the
United States should be attributed to its legal successor. In such instances, the inquiry into jurisdiction
becomes a matter of tracing the succession of the liability from one foreign state entity to another. For
example, when Indonesia liquidated PN Pertamina, its national petroleum company, it created a new
corporation, Pertamina, which succeeded to all the rights, obligations, assets, and liabilities of the
liquidated company. See Fabrikant, Pertamina: A National Oil Company in a Developing Country,
in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CENTER, LAW AND PUBLIc ENTERPRISE IN ASIA 192, 206-07 (1976).
18. International comity requires courts of one state to recognize the legislative, executive, or judi-
cial acts of another nation, with due regard both for international duty and convenience and for rights
of its citizens or other persons who are under the protection of its laws. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113, 164, 205-06 (1895) (in action in U.S. court by foreign citizen to enforce foreign judgment against
American citizen, judgment is conclusive on the merits unless some special ground such as fraud,
prejudice or violation of international law is shown).
19. The government's normal non-liability results from the separate status of a government in-
strumentality, rather than from sovereign immunity per se. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para
El Comerdio Exterior de Cuba, 103 S. Ct. at 2600 (presumption of separate status of government
instrumentalities safeguards efforts of sovereign nations to structure their governmental activities in
manner deemed necessary to promote economic development and efficient administration).
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court should do so will depend upon the specific constraints imposed by
congressional intent, the decisions of the Supreme Court, and the due pro-
cess clauses of the Constitution.20
B. Congressional Intent
The FSIA is the exclusive statute governing jurisdiction over all foreign
public entities.2" On its face, the FSIA neither directs nor forbids a court
to exercise jurisdiction on equitable grounds over indirectly involved for-
eign states. If the statute, by its silence, barred the equitable exercise of
jurisdiction, the inquiry would be at an end.22 The language of the FSIA
is ambiguous, however, about the requisite connection between a foreign
state and an act giving rise to subject matter jurisdiction.
Moreover, the legislative history expressly leaves open the possibility of
piercing the veil between an instrumentality and its parent state. Congress
did not intend the statute to affect the attribution of responsibility among
entities of a foreign state, or to resolve the issue of whether the proper
entity has been sued.2 ' Congress thus chose in the FSIA to leave open the
possibility of equitable suits, but left the development of the area to fed-
eral common law.24
C. Federal Common Law and International Law
In First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de
Cuba (Bancec),2" the Supreme Court implicitly acknowledged that, given
20. U.S. CONsT. amends. V, XIV.
21. See supra notes 3 and 7.
22. The FSIA is an exercise of Congress' undisputed power under article III, § 2 of the Constitu-
tion to decide whether and under what circumstances foreign nations should be subject to suit in the
United States. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 103 S. Ct. 1962, 1971 (1983) (congres-
sional authority over foreign commerce and foreign relations confers this undisputed power on
Congress).
23. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 12 (FSIA not intended to affect attribution of responsibility
among entities). See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 103 S. Ct.
at 2597 (FSIA does not prohibit holding foreign instrumentality owned and controlled by foreign
government responsible for actions taken by that government).
24. Peter Westen and Jeffrey Lehman have argued that in areas calling for uniform federal regu-
lation, the federal courts are authorized, either by Congress' silence or by the article III power to
make law when Congress is silent, to fashion federal common law subject to legislative oversight. This
lawmaking may also consistently be viewed as an interpretation of the statute in question. See Westen
& Lehman, Is There Life for Erie after the Death of Diversity?, 78 MicH. L. REv. 311, 332-33
(1980); Westen, After "Life for Erie"-A Reply, 78 Mical. L. REv. 971, 983, 986 (1980). Westen
concludes that "[t]he important thing is to know ...when Congress has been silent, and ...
whether an area calls for uniform federal regulation." Id. at 984 n.49. The subject discussed here
qualifies on both grounds. Federal court exercise of its common law prerogative is appropriate be-
cause of the need for uniformity to simplify dealings with foreign nations. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 116 n.7 (1978).
25. 103 S. Ct. 2591 (1983). The background of the case is set forth in Note, The Separate Entity
Fiction Exposed. Disregarding Self-Serving Recitals ofJuridical Autonomy in Nationalization Cases,
6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 288 (1983).
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Congress' silence, piercing the corporate veil of a foreign state is permissi-
ble under some circumstances. Bancec was the Cuban government's au-
tonomous credit institution for foreign trade. Bancec brought suit in fed-
eral district court to collect on a letter of credit issued by an American
bank. The Cuban government had previously seized and nationalized the
American bank's Cuban assets. The American bank counterclaimed
against Cuba, asserting a right to set off the value of its seized Cuban
assets against its debt to Bancec. The bank argued that the Court should
pierce the corporate veil between Bancec and the Cuban government.
The Supreme Court held that principles of equity in federal and inter-
national common law26 would be offended if Cuba could escape liability
for an act violating international law while Bancec, whose assets and lia-
bilities were divided between the Cuban central bank and foreign trade
ministry, could invoke the jurisdiction of a United States court to press its
claims.17 The reasoning the Court employed in Bancec to justify its deci-
sion to disregard a corporate form is valid for claims in a complaint as
well as a counterclaim. The Court failed, however, to delineate precisely
the circumstances that would justify disregard of the normal juridical sep-
aration between an instrumentality and its parent state. 8 Like Congress,
the Court has left the area open to common law development.
D. Due Process Issues
The state's defense to an assertion of jurisdiction is, in the first instance,
a claim of mistaken identity. The state's advocate points to the juridical
separation between the state and the instrumentality to demand that the
state be insulated from suit. The Supreme Court indicated in Bancec that
there is an initial presumption in favor of juridical separateness." Before
this presumption is set aside, the defendant foreign state has a due process
right to a showing that it has a connection to those acts of the instrumen-
tality that established the court's subject matter jurisdiction.30 Due process
concerns of "fair play and substantial justice"" thus limit the exercise of
26. International common law is the body of law formed by interpretation of international legal
rules. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(b), (c), 59 Stat.
1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993.
27. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comerdo Exterior de Cuba, 103 S. Ct. at 2603.
28. Id. (announcing "no mechanical formula for determining the circumstances under which the
normally separate juridical status of a government instrumentality is to be disregarded") (footnote
omitted).
29. Id. at 2600 (1983).
30. The nexus may come from the state's actions in. the forum or from its principal-agent rela-
tionship with the instrumentality. See Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea,
693 F.2d 1094, 1105-07 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (subject matter exceptions to immunity impose limits on
when a foreign state may be deemed to have "carried on" activities actually performed by another),
cer. denied, 104 S. Ct. 71 (1983).
31. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
399 '
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jurisdiction over foreign public entities as well as other potential defend-
ants to a lawsuit.
As the Supreme Court held in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,3 2
due process requires that a court assert jurisdiction only when the defend-
ant has sufficient contacts within the court's territorial jurisdiction. In cre-
ating the commercial activity exception to immunity in the FSIA, Con-
gress recognized this requirement of territorial contacts. 3 Once the court
has obtained subject matter jurisdiction, that authority is transformed into
personal jurisdiction through service of process.34 As long as the defendant
is the "foreign state" actor that engaged in the conduct giving rise to the
suit, the requirement of territorial contacts automatically takes into ac-
count the due process rights of the defendant state. 5 But where the
defendant foreign state and the instrumentality appear to be juridically
separate, due process involves two hurdles. The instrumentality's action
must properly subject the instrumentality to the jurisdiction of the court. 6
Additional justification is needed to exercise jurisdiction over the parent
state consistent with due process.
Yet the FSIA does not adequately guide courts in deciding how to safe-
guard the foreign state's due process rights in this situation. Due process
32. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
33. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-14 (FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b), embodies requirements
of minimum jurisdictional contacts and adequate notice discussed in International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)); East Europe Domestic Int'l Sales Corp. v. Terra, 467 F. Supp. 383,
387 (S.D.N.Y.) (to find personal jurisdiction over defendant foreign corporation, court must be satis-
fied that due process requirements incorporated in itemization of non-immune transactions in FSIA
have been met), affd, 610 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1979); Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673, 676
(2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (FSIA requires minimum contacts such that maintenance of suit does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice). Congress has specified that the Interna-
tional Shoe restrictions on state court jurisdiction also apply to federal jurisdiction over foreign sover-
eigns. Yet the Fifth Amendment, not the Fourteenth, governs the actions of federal courts. Moreover,
the legislative history, by itself, is not sufficiently authoritative to introduce either the Fifth or the
Fourteenth Amendment standard of due process into 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1982). Texas Trading &
Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 313 n.36 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1148 (1982). It is likely that the minimum contacts analysis of International Shoe in the
legislative history is a recognition that any exercise of personal jurisdiction is subject to the constitu-
tional limitations of due process.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1982).
35. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that a "foreign state" is a person within
the meaning of the due process clause. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 313 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). The Third, Ninth and
Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals appear to have assumed this conclusion. See Velidor v. L/P/G
Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812, 819 n.12 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. disnissed, 455 U.S. 929 (1982); Thos. P.
Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247, 1255 (9th Cir.
1980); Purdy Co. v. Argentina, 333 F.2d 95, 98 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962 (1965).
The Supreme Court has not ruled on this question.
36. Since the state is being made to answer in place of the instrumentality, it must first be shown
that the instrumentality has to answer at all. For example, in Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 517 F.
Supp. 477 (D.D.C. 1981), affd in part and rev'd in part, 682 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the
finding of jurisdiction over the instrumentalities of the Republic would constitute the prerequisite for
any effort to obtain jurisdiction over the foreign state under an equitable theory.
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requires that a court assert jurisdiction only when the defendant has suffi-
cient contacts within the court's territorial jurisdiction such that notions of
"fair play and substantial justice"' 7 would not be offended. In deciding
whether to subject a foreign state to suit for the acts of*its instrumentality,
then, the court must turn to a relevant body of principles of fairness and
justice. When the defendant is a foreign state, internationally recognized
equitable principles should guide this determination. Yet the use of equity
invites broad discretion.
II. RESTRAINING EQUITY
The ambiguity of the FSIA, the undeveloped nature of federal common
law, and uncertainty about the application of equitable principles raise
the danger that decisionmakers will invoke equity in ways difficult to pre-
dict or regularize. Erratic decisionmaking poses particular dangers in the
sensitive area of foreign relations.
To avoid these dangers, either a political or a judicial solution is con-
ceivable." The political branches could determine in each case whether
the formally separate parent government may be sued for the acts of its
instrumentality. The benefits of executive or legislative determination,
however, are either illusory or attainable through a judicial approach that
draws on the institutional strengths of courts.
A. Political Branch Determination
Deferring in this area to the executive branch has a superficial appeal.
The President, or the State Department acting as the President's delegate,
is arguably in the best position both to judge the consequences for the
United States' foreign relations of a decision to pierce a foreign state's
corporate veil, and to minimize the adverse consequences of such a deci-
sion. But placing in the executive branch the determination of any issue
affecting a foreign state's amenability to suit contradicts the clear intent of
Congress. In the FSIA, Congress unequivocally indicated its preference
for allowing the judiciary to decide all questions of jurisdiction.89 Con-
gress believed that the difficulties of determining immunity within a polit-
ical context outweighed any conceivable advantage in flexibility or bar-
37. 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
38. Ultimately, of course, the issue of whether due process has been denied in a particular pro-
ceeding is a constitutional issue for the courts to resolve. Within the constitutionally permissible
bounds of jurisdiction, however, the political branches conceivably could make or substantially direct
the individual decisions.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1982); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 14 (central premise of bill is that
decisions on claims by foreign states to immunity are best made by judiciary on basis of statutory
scheme that incorporates standards recognized under international law).
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gaining power that executive determination of immunity issues would
secure.
40
Ironically, by denying to the executive branch any authority to decide
sovereign immunity, Congress may have enlarged the President's foreign
policy freedom. 41 By placing decisionmaking authority in a branch of gov-
ernment over which the Executive has no direct control, Congress freed
the Executive from responsibility for determining questions of immunity,
and for any adverse reaction to the courts' decisions.4 2 Foreign states
therefore cannot press the Executive for a dispositive determination of im-
munity, nor lay blame for an adverse decision with the Executive. The
Executive accordingly has more freedom to pursue foreign policy
objectives.4
Moreover, a judicial approach may preserve the advantages of resting
the primary determination of immunity with the Executive. The court
may invite the United States government to submit amicus briefs that pro-
vide information not otherwise available to the court, yet essential for de-
termining whether to recognize sovereign immunity. Early involvement of
the Executive in the suit as amicus will also enable it to plan policy to
minimize any adverse consequences of a court decision against the foreign
state.44
40. In determining immunity, the State Department was in the awkward position of trying to
apply a legal standard to litigation already before the courts. It also lacked the procedural machinery
to take evidence, hear witnesses, or allow appeals. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 8.
41. The State Department can authoritatively inform a foreign state seeking to avoid liability for
acts of one of its instrumentalities that it can expect no aid as a matter of right from the political
branches. Cf. Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary on
H.R. 11315, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1976) (hereinafter cited as 1976 Hearings) (statement of
Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser to the State Department) (no advantages to allowing State Department
to make political determination of foreign state's immunity in court; disadvantage of such power to
enter political judgment would be that Department becomes involved in many cases where its officials
would rather not do anything at all but face enormous pressure from foreign government to do
something).
42. This argument presupposes that foreign governments understand and make allowances for the
doctrine of separation of powers. Such an assumption is not unique to this context. In making treaties
with the President, for example, foreign governments must take into account the fact that the Presi-
dent's action is subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, ci. 2.
43. For an example of the State Department's dispositive determination of immunity, see Rich v.
Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24, 26 (4th Cir. 1961) (per curiam) (State Department's certification
of immunity for ship belonging to government of Cuba accepted by court without further inquiry).
This certification of immunity was necessary to avoid further disturbance in relations between the
United States and Cuba: See A. CHAYES, T. EHRLicH & A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
PRoCESS 109, 147 (1968).
44. For example, the United States Department of Justice advised a federal district judge that
failure to set aside a default judgment against the government of China for the value of bearer bonds
issued by the Imperial Chinese government in 1911, Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 550 F.
Supp. 869 (N.D. Ala. 1982), would exacerbate international tensions and could be expected to harm
bilateral relations with China. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1983, at D2, col. 1. The judge later set aside the
default judgment and ruled that he would accept evidence from both parties on China's motion to
dismiss. Wall St. J., Feb. 29, 1984, at 32, col. 5. The court, while responding to the U.S. govern-
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Another political solution, legislation requiring courts to set aside cor-
porate separateness in certain categories of cases, seems attractive because
it offers uniformity and efficient disposition. But it prevents courts from
tailoring their responses to unanticipated situations. In addition, fixed
rules themselves will not eliminate, and may exacerbate, the difficulty of
determining whether they are applicable in a given instance. Of course,
once precedent and experience with the types of difficulties likely to arise
have accumulated, Congress would be in a better position to codify judi-
cially developed rules. Premature codification, however, would run
counter to the FSIA's broad mandate of discretion to the courts.45
B. The Judicial Approach
Vesting the authority to decide whether to pierce the veil between a
foreign state and its instrumentality in the judiciary is consistent with the
FSIA's requirement that courts determine all issues of foreign sovereign
immunity. Moreover, the courts offer a particular institutional competence
well-suited to this type of decision, which demands factual investigation,
equitable judgment, and strict attention to the due process rights of the
potential foreign state defendant. Courts, then, rather than the political
branches, should make these equitable decisions.
The two existing relevant bodies of law, however, are inadequate to
guide courts in deciding jurisdiction over foreign states for acts of their
instrumentalities. 46 First, the law of jurisdiction over foreign corporations
for acts of their subsidiaries is designed for purely domestic circumstances,
and overlooks the potential foreign policy harm of piercing a veil created
by a foreign sovereign. Domestic law permits veil-piercing in situations
likely to offend foreign states.47 Second, the existing substantive law of
ment's advice on the foreign relations impact of a default judgment, retained its jurisdiction over the
dispute. The court later dismissed the bondholders' claims, ruling that the FSIA does not apply to
transactions that took place before the statute was enacted. N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1984, at 38, col. 4.
45. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 41, at 53 (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser to the
State Department) (FSIA recognizes legislative inability to delineate commercial-governmental dis-
tinction and leaves issue to courts, with very modest guidance, to work out on case by case basis).
46. One might argue that the FSIA requires that state law determine whether the foreign state's
corporate veil should be set aside. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1982) holds a foreign state "liable in the same
rpanner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." But this standard of
liability only applies "to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is not entitled to
immunity." Only after the foreign state is denied immunity does § 1606 specify the substantive stand-
ards by which the foreign state's acts are to be judged. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El
Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 103 S. Ct. at 2597-98 n.11 (distinguishing non-state-law question of
attributing liability among entities of foreign state from application of state liability standards once
proper defendant foreign state entity has been identified). These substantive standards need not come
from state law; conflicts of law principles would govern the choice of applicable law. See Note, For-
eign Sovereign Inmunity and Commercial Activity: A Conflicts Approach, supra note 5, at 1473
n.142 & 1497-1501.
47. The domestic legal standards that define when a foreign corporation may be sued for the acts
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piercing the corporate veil is diffuse and ambiguous, and transferring it to
the jurisdictional context would introduce a new layer of ambiguity.48
III. A DUE PROCESS MODEL OF EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OVER
FOREIGN STATES
Rather than attempting to apply the existing domestic law of piercing
the corporate veil to assert jurisdiction, the judiciary should develop a
body of federal common law49 that draws on the institutional strengths of
courts: their ability to address factual uncertainty by allocating burdens of
pleading and proof, and their ability to reach reasoned decisions50 based
on principles that the international community of states recognizes."'
This Note proposes an exclusive set of circumstances that would trigger
veil-piercing to reach a foreign state not directly involved in the acts in
of a juridically separate entity would offend foreign sovereigns if applied to government-owned corpo-
rations. Courts in the United States often assert personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations on the
basis of broad, vague standards that do not take foreign sovereignty into account. See Bulova Watch
Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1347 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (personal jurisdiction over
Japanese corporation that used subsidiaries to penetrate New York market); Andrulonis v. United
States, 526 F. Supp. 183, 189, 191 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (personal jurisdiction over defendant foreign
manufacturer that was held to share sufficient "corporate intimacy" with domestic distributor; dictum
that litigation in a foreign jurisdiction is price that companies active in international trade must pay).
The New York Court of Appeals found that a corporation is present when a service does all the
business that the foreign corporation could do were its own officials in the forum state. Frummer v.
Hilton Hotels Int'l Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, remittitur amended, 20
N.Y.2d 737, 229 N.E.2d 696, 283 N.Y.S.2d 99, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967). The Second
Circuit adopted this test in Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 385 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 996 (1967), ruling that a foreign corporation is doing business in New York when
its New York representative provides services sufficiently important to the foreign corporation that, if
it did not have a representative, the corporation's own officials would undertake to perform similar
services. If applied to a foreign state, this test would subject the state to equitable jurisdiction when-
ever a factually as well as nominally distinct entity (not necessarily an instrumentality) engaged in
investment or sales activity that the foreign state could do if it had chosen to enter New York on its
own. Such assertions of jurisdiction would display no respect for foreign sovereigns, and might result
either in retaliation or in a cessation of all activity that conceivably substitutes for the foreign state's
own commercial activities in the U.S. forum.
48. See E. LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 191 (1936) (many tests to
guide courts are illusory and give no intelligible principle); Comment, Piercing the Corporate Veil in
Federal Courts: Is Circumvention of a Statute Enough?, 13 PAc. L.J. 1245, 1246 (1982) (piercing
doctrine has been applied inconsistently and confusingly).
49. See supra note 24.
50. Reasoned written decisions rendered by a court provide notice to guide future conduct, pre-
serve a record for appeal, and heighten the sense that principles rather than realpolitik have operated.
Even the abstention inquiry in Part IV, infra, is based on principles of judicial self-restraint rather
than mere susceptibility to political pressures.
51. Because international law is relevant to the federal court's equitable decision to take jurisdic-
tion, the court must find and apply international principles. Just as a court must resolve any constitu-
tional issues necessary to reach its decision, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), a
court must interpret international legal questions that arise in its deliberations. International law is
part of the law of the United States, which courts must ascertain and administer whenever questions
of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. See The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (applying international legal rule that coast fishing vessels peaceably engaged
are exempt from capture as prize of war).
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question. If the plaintiff fails to plead and to support 2 one or more of
these circumstances, his claims against the foreign state should be dis-
missed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, on motion of the state53 or
sua sponte.54 By imposing a high initial burden on the plaintiff to over-
come a presumption of juridical separation, this proposal recognizes the
deference normally due to a foreign state.55 Moreover, in determining
when a plaintiff has overcome the presumption, this proposal relies on the
principles of international law. By turning to international law, courts
will follow the intent of Congress. 6 They will also draw on ideas of fun-
damental fairness that bind all sovereign states.57
52. Before ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court may grant limited discovery. The granting of
discovery orders, however, must be tempered by an awareness of their potential to damage friendly
relations between states and of special governmental privileges for state secrets. See 8 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2019 (1970 & Supp. 1984); RESTATEMENT OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 420 comment c (Tent. Draft. No. 3,
1982) (court cannot compel discovery of communications privileged when made); cf. Ghana Supply
Comm'n v. New Eng. Power Co., 83 F.R.D. 586, 595 (D. Mass. 1979) (by initiating suit through
corporation under its control, Ghana waived any governmental privilege and must decide whether
secrecy of materials ordered to be produced is worth dismissal of suit).
For the same reasons of comity, FED. R. Ci. P. 37(b)(2) sanctions should be used extremely
sparingly and only after the foreign state has had adequate opportunity to come forward with evi-
dence on its own or otherwise to demonstrate good faith. See In Re Oil Spill by The Amoco Cadiz, 93
F.R.D. 840, 843 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (refusing to impose sanctions on France for failure to comply with
discovery orders where non-compliance was neither willful nor in bad faith but required by French
non-disclosure statute). The Restatement draft would limit sanctions to "cases of deliberate conceal-
ment or removal of information" or of failure to "make a good faith effort to secure permission from
the foreign authorities to make the information available." RESTATEmENT OF THE FOREIGN REA-
TIONs LAW OF THE UNrr STATES § 420 (2)(b), (a) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982). Cf. Insurance
Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S. 694, 708 (1982) (upholding sanction
of personal jurisdiction over non-sovereign corporate entity that had notice of possible sanction and
ample opportunity to comply).
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
54. The court has a duty to dismiss the action sua sponte if the foreign state does not appear and
the evidence is inadequate to support jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1982) (requiring evidence
satisfactory to court before judgment by default is entered).
55. If the foreign state fails to make the necessary showing, and the court determines that it may
take jurisdiction over the foreign state, the state would then have to defend the suit or face default
judgment. A state could only attack this judgment collaterally if it neither contested jurisdiction nor
litigated the merits. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S.
694, 706 (1982) (defendant may either ignore judicial proceedings and bring collateral challenge to
default judgment on jurisdictional grounds or challenge jurisdiction in initial proceeding, thus agree-
ing to abide by court's determination of jurisdictional issue); Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment
v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094, 1099 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (dicta) (defendant that district court
subjected to arbitration by default could raise jurisdictional issue as collateral attack on holding of
proceeding to confirm arbitral award), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 71 (1983).
56. The veil-piercing inquiry proceeds under the FSIA. See supra p. 398. Congress intended that
this statute would make U.S. law on sovereign immunity consistent with international law. See Mc-
Keel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582, 587 (9th Cir. 1983) (applying international law
under FSIA to bar tort action for damages suffered at U.S. embassy in Iran); Texas Trading &
Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 310 (2d Cir. 1981) (interpreting inter-
national law to deny immunity for commercial activity of cement contracts and letters of credit), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 7-9. Therefore, any determination
of equitable jurisdiction, which is also an interpretation of the FSIA, must accord with international
principles.
57. International law accepts that piercing the corporate veil in appropriate circumstances is con-
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Should the plaintiff substantiate allegations of indirect wrongdoing by
the foreign state, the burden then shifts to the foreign state."8 The state
would have to demonstrate why the court should respect juridical separa-
tion by declining jurisdiction.
Before discussing the circumstances that should shift the burden of
proof to the foreign state, two procedural postures need to be distin-
guished. In the first, a private entity as plaintiff seeks to pierce the veil
and recover from the state because the foreign instrumentality, the pri-
mary defendant, lacks assets in the United States or has dissolved. In the
second, a private entity as defendant moves that the court require the for-
eign state as plaintiff to answer a counterclaim for the acts of its
instrumentality.
A decision in the first posture to equate the two entities will impose a
greater burden on a foreign entity to appear and defend, and is more
likely to offend the foreign state. In the counterclaim posture, in contrast,
sonant with fair play and substantial justice. General principles of law recognized by civilized nations,
and the writings of qualified jurists, are two sources that give rise to valid rules of international law.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993.
General principles of law and the writings of jurists support the idea that a foreign state may not
always rely on the presumption of corporate separateness. Equity (in the sense of general rules dic-
tated by fairness, impartiality, and justice) is a part of international law. See Murty, Seutlenent of
Disputes, in MANUAL OF PUBuC INTERNATIONAL LAW 673, 691 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968); Jennings,
General Course on Principles of International Law, 2 RECUEIL DES CoURs 323, 343 (1967). The
International Court of Justice and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of Justice, have recognized
the general principles of preventing abuse of rights and prohibiting a party from taking advantage of
its own wrong. See Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, 2 RECUEIL DES COURS 1,
58-59 (1962).
More specifically, in Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3
(Judgment of Feb. 5), Belgium sought to sue Spain for alleged injuries that Belgian nationals, as
shareholders of a Canadian corporation, had suffered. The issue was whether the injury of the Cana-
dian corporation could be attributed to the Belgian shareholders in order to confer standing on
Belgium. The International Court of Justice found that Belgium lacked standing, but its discussion of
whether the court could pierce the veil posed by the corporation's Canadian incorporation revealed
that international law admits equitable piercing of the corporate veil. The Court observed that the
distinction between the company and the shareholders was derived from municipal law, and that
international law refers to "rules generally accepted by municipal legal systems which recognize the
limited company whose capital is represented by shares." Id. at 37. On the international plane, the
Court concluded, "municipal law indicates that the veil is lifted.. to prevent the misuse of the
privileges of legal personality, as in certain cases of fraud or malfeasance, to protect third persons such
as a creditor or purchaser, or to prevent the evasion of legal requirements or of obligations." Id. at 39.
58. The FSIA does not definitively state how burdens of proof should be allocated. Courts may
view a claim to immunity as a jurisdictional issue under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1982), but the burden
of proving the claim is on the foreign state, as it is in an affirmative defense. See HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 3, at 17 (treating claim of immunity like affirmative defense for purpose of burden of
proof). Courts have treated sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense, insofar as they have placed
the burden of pleading and ultimately proving it on the defendant state. See Arango v. Guzman
Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1378 (5th Cir. 1980); Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian
Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383, 389 n.16 (D.N.J. 1979). In light of the FSIA's ambiguity, courts could
reasonably require the plaintiff to make out an initial case for jurisdiction over the foreign state, then
require the state to come forward with its affirmative claim of immunity by virtue of its factual as
well as juridical separation from the sued instrumentality. The state's failure to present a satisfactory
claim would help the court to determine that it may take jurisdiction.
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the foreign entity has availed itself of the judicial process of the United
States.59 By entering court, this foreign entity is on notice that it may have
to answer a counterclaim on behalf of a related entity. Attributing the acts
of one entity to the other in this counterclaim situation is therefore less
subject to due process objections, and will require a lesser factual showing
than is required to initiate a claim against a defendant foreign state.60
A. "Alter Ego" and "Shell"
Two alleged characteristics of a corporate instrumentality, "alter ego"
and "shell," if supported by the record, should enable the plaintiff to ob-
tain jurisdiction in either a claim or counterclaim situation."' In the alter
ego cage, the instrumentality against which the plaintiff has a direct claim
was never really separate from the foreign state. The foreign state treated
the assets of the corporation as its own and added or withdrew capital
from the instrumentality at will.62 The two entities did not maintain sepa-
rate records or formalities. A plaintiff could not tell with which entity he
was negotiating, or could justifiably have believed he was negotiating with
the foreign state.6 s
59. Prior to the FSIA, the Supreme Court recognized in National City Bank v. Republic of
China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955), that "consideration of fair dealing," id. at 365, dictated that a foreign
government could not invoke United States law while resisting a claim against it that would curtail its
recovery. Id. at 361-62. The Republic of China, suing a U.S. defendant on behalf of an agency,
unsuccessfully argued sovereign immunity as a defense against defendant's counterclaim for defaulted
treasury notes of the Republic. See also First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S.
759 (1972) (plurality opinion) (American bank, sued by one of Cuba's incorporated instrumentalities,
may counterclaim against Cuban government for seizure of American property).
60. The Supreme Court implicitly reasoned that due process did not preclude an equitable coun-
terclaim in First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 103 S. Ct. 2591
(1983). The American bank was permitted to assert against the Cuban bank (Bancec) a debt that
Cuba owed to the American bank, although Bancec was not a party to any proceeding adjudicating
the liability of Cuba to the American bank.
The Court's opinion did not address the question whether allowing a setoff violated Bancec's due
process rights. This omission is best explained by the tenuousness of any due process claim. See
DeLetelier v. Republic of Chile, 567 F. Supp. 1490, 1503 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (concluding that due
process similarly does not preclude execution against assets of Chilean national airline to satisfy judg-
ment against Chile).
61. The plaintiff would serve process on both the instrumentality, if still existing, and the foreign
state under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1982).
62. Foreign jurisdictions have also applied the equitable principle of ignoring corporate forms. See
Wallersteiner v. Moir, [1974] 3 All E.R. 217, 237-38 (C.A.) (holding defendant personally liable for
activities of companies, trusts, and other legal entities that he treated as his puppets); Europemballage
Corp. v. Commission of the European Communities, 1973-1 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 215, 242,
[1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKtT. REP. (CCH) 8171 (1973) (imputing conduct of subsid-
iary to parent company for jurisdictional purposes). For an extreme example of veil-piercing, see X. v.
Czechoslovakia, Sz 23/143, Supruchreportorium Wo. 28 Neu. (Sup. Ct. Austria 1950), reprinted in
UNITED NATIONS, MATERIALS ON JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THER PROPERTY
183, 183 (1982) (respondent found to be Czechoslovakia, even though it engaged in business under
another name; use of firm name does not bring into existence new legal entity distinguishable from
owner of firm).
63. For an example of this type of abuse of the corporate form in a domestic context, see Clarke
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 94: 394, 1984
In this circumstance, asserting jurisdiction over the foreign state would
not invade its due process rights. The foreign state, acting through its
instrumentality, has engaged in commercial activity touching the United
States. 64 The involvement of the foreign state in the act giving rise to sub-
ject matter jurisdiction is clear. Because the state and the instrumentality
were factually indistinguishable from each other for the activities on
which the plaintiff's claim is founded, the act of the instrumentality is in
effect the act of the state.
In the shell situation, the state and the state-owned instrumentality op-
erated independently in appearance, but the instrumentality was so seri-
ously undercapitalized that it could not meet reasonably expected obliga-
tions. Full capitalization is the prerequisite of limited liability.65
Therefore, the owner of a mere shell should not be able to rely on its
juridical separateness. 6 The undercapitalization of the subsidiary fur-
nishes the requisite nexus between the foreign state and the instrumental-
ity's wrongdoing. In effect, the acts of an undercapitalized instrumentality
represent the foreign state's own commercial activity outside of the United
States with effects within the United States.
B. Agency for the Specific Transaction
The foreign state and the instrumentality may be juridically separate,
factually distinct, and adequately capitalized, yet in a particular transac-
Auto Co. V. Fyffe, 124 Ind. App. 222, 116 N.E.2d 532 (1954) (finding two corporations merged for
purpose of suit because innocent third parties had no way of knowing with which corporation they
were dealing).
64. Under this analysis, the plaintiff in Gibbons v. Republic of Ireland, 532 F. Supp. 668
(D.D.C. 1982) would be unsuccessful in making the required threshold showing of alter ego or shell.
The plaintiff attempted to sue Ireland as principal for false representations and tortious interference
with contractual relations committed by the country's alleged agents, two instrumentalities of the gov-
ernment. The plaintiff only alleged that the government's ministries had the authority to control cer-
tain of the instrumentalities' operations and that the instrumentalities pursued the economic develop-
ment policy of the Republic. The plaintiff did not support an allegation that Ireland was an alter ego
of the instrumentalities, or used them as shells. Ireland's motion to dismiss a suit based on an alter ego
or shell theory would therefore be granted at an early stage. Because plaintiff did not allege that
Ireland specifically authorized the instrumentality to commit the alleged torts, a motion to dismiss
based on an agency theory, see infra p. 409, would also be granted.
65. See H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 302-03 (1946) (shareholders of cor-
poration doing business without sufficient assets to meet prospective liabilities may not escape per-
sonal liability).
66. Inadequate capitalization of the corporation to provide for payment of foreseeable creditors'
claims leads courts to pierce the corporate veil. See Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944)
(obvious inadequacy of capital is frequently important factor in cases denying limited liability to
shareholders); Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 579, 364 P.2d 473, 475, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643
(1961) (inadequate capitalization constitutes ground for imposing shareholder liability); cJ. Barcelona
Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 39 (veil is lifted to protect creditor or to
prevent evasion of legal requirements or obligations); Companies Act 1981 of Australia, § 556(1),
cited in H. FORD, PRINCIPLES OF COMPANY LAW 146 (1982) (holding director liable if company
incurs debt when reasonable grounds exist to expect it will not be able to meet all its debts and
company later fails).
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tion the instrumentality may act as the state's agent. The instrumentality's
amenability to United States subject matter jurisdiction then suffices to
subject the state as principal to jurisdiction for claims founded on that
particular exercise of agency authority. 7 A plaintiff who alleges that the
instrumentality acted in a particular transaction as the state's agent should
therefore be allowed to reach the foreign state for claims founded on that
transaction. This limitation to the particular scope of the principal-agent
relationship makes more stringent the domestic law standard of agency
relationship or control required to subject a foreign corporation to suit.68
C. Joint Adventurers
A third set of facts should enable a counterclaiming defendant in
United States court, but not a plaintiff, to equate the identities of the two
joint adventurers when only one of them has brought suit. Assume the
instrumentality was neither an alter ego, a shell, nor a designated agent.
The state's and the instrumentality's sequences of moves into court and
activities outside of court may still have the effect of enabling one party to
escape the jurisdiction of a United States court while the other reaps the
benefit of access to court on a distinct cause of action. Three patterns are
distinguishable.
In the first, the entity breaches a commercial contract or commits a tort
in the United States and the state either orders the entity to cease business
in the United States or dissolves it. If the state does not take further steps
in this country, the cause of action will not be within the effective jurisdic-
tion of United States courts. Dissolution of an entity ends its legal exist-
ence. But a different situation arises if the state then sues on another
cause of action. 9 By acting in this manner, the state may sometimes equi-
tably identify itself with the instrumentality that had the requisite contacts
for United States jurisdiction over the original contract or tort dispute.
The state creates an inference that it abused corporate formalities. The
67. See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 314 (2d
Cir. 1981) (actions of defendant in forum and actions relevant to transaction by agent on defendant's
behalf may support personal jurisdiction), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982); see also European Con-
vention on State Immunity, art. 7, May 16, 1972, Europ. T.S. No. 74 (denying immunity to signatory
state if it has on territory of forum state an office or agency through which it engages in industrial,
commercial, or financial activity, and proceedings relate to that activity of office or agency).
68. See supra note 47.
69. Cf C. Czarnikow Ltd. v. Centrala Handlu Zagranicznego 'Rolimpex,' 1979 A.C. 351 (H.L.),
in which the parent government did prevent the instrumentality from continuing its business but did
not seek access to the British courts. The House of Lords affirmed a decision that Rolimpex, a Polish
state trading enterprise, could successfully assert a defense of force majeure in an action for breach of
contract to sell sugar overseas. Lord Wilberforce allowed Rolimpex's defense that the Polish govern-
ment had instituted a ban on the foreign sale of sugar. The enterprise could not be regarded as an
organ of the state absent clear evidence and definite findings that the foreign government took the
action "purely in order to extricate a state enterprise from contractual liability." Id. at 364.
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state may rebut the inference by showing that the dissolution was in the
normal course of business and not designed to thwart creditors.70 Shifting
the burden is appropriate because the state, not the plaintiff, has the in-
formation necessary to establish the bona fide reasons for the instrumen-
tality's dissolution.
7 1
In the second pattern, the state wrongfully harms a domestic plaintiff,
and the state's instrumentality sues in United States court for an unrelated
cause of action. If the facts of this unrelated cause of action suggest that
the foreign state is the real party in interest, subjecting the instrumentality
to a counterclaim based on the state's harm to the plaintiff may be equita-
ble."2 Once again, the burden of rebuttal shifts to the instrumentality to
demonstrate that the instrumentality's assets did not pass to the state,
thereby rendering the state the real party in interest. Like the first pat-
tern, the second describes the inequity of a foreign state's avoiding a coun-
terclaim by using corporate forms.
The third pattern presents an even stronger equitable case for a coun-
terclaim against the instrumentality. A foreign state wrongfully harms a
domestic party, then creates an instrumentality whose operations are made
possible by that wrong. The instrumentality then sues the domestic party
in the United States on a cause of action arising out of those operations.
73
Allowing a counterclaim against the instrumentality is necessary in order
to deny to the instrumentality the double benefit of immunity for the
wrong of its joint adventurer, the foreign state, and of enforcement in
70. This presumption of bad faith has an analogy in state bankruptcy law. A conveyance render-
ing a person insolvent is deemed fraudulent to a creditor without regard to actual intent if the convey-
ance is made without a fair consideration. See N.Y. DEBT. CRED. LAW § 273 (McKinney 1945 &
Supp. 1983).
71. The issue raised is a factual one. The facts are most likely to be easily accessible to the foreign
state; indeed, because of foreign secrecy laws, they may be unavailable to the plaintiff through discov-
ery. See Kane, supra note 4, at 420-21 (placing burden of rebuttal on party best able to provide
necessary information is proven guide for allocation and is sanctioned by Congress).
72. The foreign state has become the real party in interest because the instrumentality, before
bringing suit, transferred its claim to the foreign state as part of a non-fraudulent transaction. The
majority opinion accepted the view that Cuba became the real party in interest in First Nat'l City
Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 103 S. Ct. 2591 (1983). The record, however, did
not clearly establish whether the government of Cuba had received the defunct instrumentality's assets
and liabilities. Id. at 2604-05 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Becoming the
real party in interest is distinguishable from a fraudulent transfer, infra note 76, which renders the
foreign state itself a wrongdoer rather than merely subjecting the state to counterclaims for some prior
wrongdoing.
73. See Ethiopian Spice Extraction Share Co. v. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co., 543 F. Supp.
1224 (W.D. Mich. 1982), rev'd sub nor. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military
Gov't of Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984), in which Ethiopia expropriated a spice-
sugar plant, which became a state instrumentality. The new instrumentality then sued in United
States court to collect on invoices for sugar already shipped before the expropriation. See also infra
note 74 (similar facts).
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United States court of the instrumentality's claim to proceeds deriving
from the same wrongdoing."'
D. "Same Asset" Pattern
If a domestic plaintiff's allegations fall within the "same asset" pattern,
the court should not take jurisdiction over the foreign entity. In this pat-
tern, the entity wrongs the plaintiff, then passes specific property related
to that legal wrong to a foreign state in a bona fide transaction. Not seek-
ing access to court, the foreign state is tied to the instrumentality's wrong-
doing only by possession of property that arose out of the transaction on
which the claim against the entity is based. 5 The domestic plaintiff
should not be allowed to compel an appearance by the foreign state, unless
the instrumentality's conveyance of the property to the foreign state was
fraudulent. 8
Absent fraud, an exercise of jurisdiction over the foreign state would
display no regard for legal separation of entities and might provoke retali-
ation by foreign courts. No causal nexus exists between the foreign state's
coming into possession of assets after the instrumentality used or obtained
them in injuring the plaintiff, and the act of the instrumentality. To ac-
cept this rationale for disregarding the normal separation of the state from
74. If, on the other hand, the foreign entity has not availed itself of U.S. judicial process, it cannot
be made to answer as defendant for a nationalization committed by the state. In Alberti v. Empresa
Nicaraguense de la Came, 705 F.2d 250, 254 (7th Cir. 1983), the government of Nicaragua national-
ized plaintiff's corporation. Plaintiff then accepted delivery of food from ENCAR, an agent operating
the expropriated company, without paying, and sought a declaratory judgment that it could offset the
value of its expropriated holdings against the value of the food purchased. The court dismissed the
suit, holding that the Republic of China rationale, 348 U.S. 356 (1955), for allowing a counterclaim
based on the expropriation did not come into play unless and until ENCAR sued on the debt.
75. This situation is distinct from the one described in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1982), which
denies immunity to a foreign state when rights in property taken in violation of international law are
at issue and that property, or any property exchanged for such property, is present in the United
States under specific circumstances.
76. The state would not be insulated from suit if it fraudulently accepted property of the instru-
mentality in order either to shelter the instrumentality from suit or, in the extreme case, to bring the
instrumentality into insolvency.
This situation presents a stronger equitable case for suing the foreign state than does the situation
described supra p. 410. There the foreign state is the real party in interest, so that a counterclaim
against it is appropriate. Here the foreign state is not merely the beneficiary of the instrumentality; it
has aided and abetted the instrumentality in its escape from judgment. Therefore the creditor of the
instrumentality should be able to sue the state to reach the property that the instrumentality, in
attempting to avoid liability, fraudulently conveyed.
State debtor-creditor law provides a domestic analogy. New York's fraudulent conveyance statute,
for example, declares fraudulent every conveyance made by (1) a person who is rendered insolvent if
the conveyance is made without a fair consideration; (2) a person engaging in a business for which the
property remaining in his hands after the conveyance is an unreasonably small capital; or (3) a person
who intends to incur debts beyond his ability to pay as they mature. The creditor may have any
fraudulent conveyance set aside or may attach the property conveyed as against any person except a
bona fide innocent purchaser. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW §§ 273-75, 278 (McKinney 1945 & Supp.
1983).
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its instrumentality would taint the state with the wrongdoing of the in-
strumentality after the fact and without any independent wrongdoing on
the part of the state.7
IV. PRUDENCE AND ABSTENTION
The above analysis will enable courts to identify the minimum show-
ings by a plaintiff that will support jurisdiction over a foreign state for
indirect involvement in the acts of its instrumentality. Courts, however,
may also choose as a matter of prudence to abstain from asserting jurisdic-
tion in order to protect comity."8 The doctrine of judicial abstention vis-a-
vis foreign states79 should inform the decision to assert or decline jurisdic-
tion over a foreign state that has unfairly taken advantage of corporate
forms. 80
The abstention inquiry, which employs a jurisdictional rule of reason,"
weighs the perceived need for the court to assert jurisdiction 2 against the
77. Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), in which the ultimate issue
was whether title to the sugar had passed to Banco Nacional. That issue turned on whether the
expropriation of the sugar had violated international law and was therefore incapable of creating valid
title in the expropriator.
78. See RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 com-
ment a (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981) (courts in exercising jurisdiction have interpreted acts of Congress
of undefined scope so as to limit their reach).
79. See Note, The Applicability of the Antitrust Laws to International Cartels Involving Foreign
Governments, 91 YALE L.J. 765, 786-88 (1982) (discussing judicial abstention doctrine).
80. Both the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law and the decision to pierce the veil of
a foreign state instrumentality involve exercises of jurisdiction to protect broadly defined American
economic interests. Since this jurisdiction may conflict with the legislation, foreign policy objectives, or
judicial proceedings of foreign states, comity requires U.S. courts to consider the possibility of absten-
tion where necessary to avoid intrusive overreaching into the internal affairs of foreign states. Declin-
ing jurisdiction whenever a foreign state would be likely to object, however, would overlook the inter-
ests of parties seeking relief against the foreign state. Courts therefore seek to weigh these factors
through a balancing test. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
Similarly, courts that issue and enforce discovery orders must maintain authority over their own
procedure while demonstrating respect for the foreign state against which discovery is sought. These
two imperatives, however, are accommodated within a two-step process in which the court first de-
cides whether to compel discovery. Compare Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 205-06
(1958) (foreign nondisclosure laws do not preclude court from ordering production of documents
abroad) with United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 902-04 (2d Cir. 1968) (balancing
national interests of U.S. against those of foreign state in its bank secrecy law in order to determine
whether a bank had to comply with U.S. grand jury subpoena). In the second step, the court decides
whether to impose sanctions on a foreign state for non-compliance with the discovery order. See RE-
STATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 420 comment f (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1982). The decision of whether to abstain from exercising equitable jurisdiction over a
foreign state resembles the decision of whether to assert antitrust jurisdiction abroad, because it must
be taken at a single stage of the court's proceedings.
81. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597, 613
(9th Cir. 1976) (establishing jurisdictional rule of reason approach), complaint dismissed on remand,
574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (applying jurisdictional rule of reason approach). See also RE-
STATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES § 403 (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1981) (state may not exercise jurisdiction unreasonably).
82. In Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979), the
court investigated the following factors, inter alia, in deciding whether to assert jurisdiction: (1) de-
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benefits of declining jurisdiction."3 If the plaintiff has succeeded in estab-
lishing a factual basis for jurisdiction, the need to exercise jurisdiction will
normally exist.84 But the abstention calculus also focuses on any harmful
effects that an assertion of jurisdiction might trigger and that abstention
would avoid. For example, the potential for conflict with another state
and the unavailability of a remedy even if judgment is rendered against
the foreign state would both suggest abstention. 5 In this inquiry, the role
of the executive branch as a source of information may be vital. 8 An
gree of conflict with foreign law or policy; (2) nationality of the parties; (3) availability of a remedy
abroad and pendency of litigation there; (4) existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce
and its foreseeability; (5) whether relief would require a party to perform an act that is illegal in
either country or to meet conflicting obligations in the two countries; (6) whether an order for relief
would be acceptable in this country if a foreign state made the order under similar circumstances; (7)
whether a treaty with the affected nations addresses the issue. See also Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1976) (court should weigh
contacts and interests of U.S. against those of foreign states).
83. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979), looked
to the following factors: (1) the relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared
to that abroad; (2) the possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and
grants relief; (3) whether the court can make its order effective. See also Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976) (court should assess
degree of conflict to be precipitated by exercise of jurisdiction).
84. The need for jurisdiction is established by weighing concerns for the protection of uniquely
American interests against those for safeguarding alternative remedies. See supra note 82. The federal
government has a strong interest in protecting overseas trade and investment and in maintaining legal
standards for that purpose. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1,
First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 103 S. Ct. 2591 (1983). See also
1976 Hearings, supra note 41, at 27 (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser to the State Depart-
ment) (no justification in international law for allowing foreign state which has entered marketplace
or acted as private party to shift everyday burdens of marketplace onto private parties).
In some circumstances, however, the need for U.S. jurisdiction may be less compelling because a
treaty between the U.S. and the involved foreign state disposes of the issue. The availability of suit
abroad may also diminish the necessity for a U.S. court to examine conduct of a foreign state. Under
forum non conveniens analysis, the availability of suit abroad is a necessary but not suffcient condi-
tion for dismissal. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1947). In deciding whether
the availability of an alternative forum eliminates the need for it to exercise jurisdiction, the U.S.
court evaluates the plaintiff's private interests, the relative inconvenience to the parties of the two fora,
and the potential forum's interest in hearing the case. Id. at 508-09. See also Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981) (overcomes strong presumption in favor of resident or citizen plain-
tiff's choice of forum when private and public interest factors clearly point toward trial in alternative
forum).
85. Congress has approved the rule of reason approach followed in Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976). The Export Trading
Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233, modified the Sherman Act to require a
direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on trade or commerce with foreign nations as a
jurisdictional threshold for application of the antitrust statute. Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 402, 96 Stat.
1233, 1246 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1982)). The legislative history of this provision states that it
is "intended neither to prevent nor to encourage additional judicial recognition of the special inter-
national characteristics of transactions." If a court determines that it has subject matter jurisdiction,
the provision would not affect the court's ability to employ notions of comity as it did in Tinberlane
or otherwise to take account of the international character of the transaction. H.R. REP. No. 686,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2487, 2498.
86. The executive branch may provide information to the court, but its position on immunity
would not be dispositive. See supra notes 41 & 44. The executive branch's limited role is consistent
with the expectations of the State Department that the FSIA would depoliticize the area of sovereign
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amicus brief by the United States, particularly if the foreign state made no
appearance, would inform the court of particular foreign sensitivities, rel-
evant principles in the foreign state's own legal system, and the availabil-
ity of funds from which a judgment could be collected.
CONCLUSION
The courts should follow a two-step inquiry in determining jurisdiction
over a foreign state that has attempted to distance itself from its responsi-
bility for the injurious acts of one of its instrumentalities. First, courts
should identify the allocation of burdens of pleading and proof between
the party seeking relief and the foreign state. This procedure determines
whether taking jurisdiction over the foreign state would serve fundamental
fairness. The proposed analysis also enables courts to work within the
framework imposed by Congress to bring uniformity to the threshold de-
termination of whether jurisdiction is permissible. The due process clause
limits how far courts may reach, ensuring a generalized respect for foreign
sovereigns and specifying whether plaintiffs may summon a foreign state
into court when suing the nominally separate entity is inconvenient or
impossible.
Second, even if the facts allow jurisdiction because the instrumentality
was an alter ego, shell, agent, or joint adventurer of the foreign state,
courts should ensure that an assertion of jurisdiction is both necessary and
potentially beneficial. In this way, the judiciary can strive to maintain the
delicate balance between equilibrium in the conduct of foreign relations
and relief for private plaintiffs that Congress attempted to strike in the
FSIA.
-Ronald D. Lee
immunity, placing responsibility for questions of immunity in the courts. The limited weight attached
to positions taken by the U.S. government also reciprocates the approach of foreign states, which
almost universally pass upon questions of sovereign immunity as a matter of law in the courts and not
as a matter of foreign policy in the political branches. 1976 Hearings, supra note 41, at 31 (statement
of Bruno Ristau).
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